



Source – Ed Taylor – Sep 2015 Governor's Safety Conference



Ring of Fire

The Ring of Fire accounts for 90% of all earthquakes, and 81% of the world's largest earthquakes

Subduction zones are shown in red

The CSZ fault line is part of the Ring of Fire


The CSZ is the only significant fault line on the Ring of Fire without a major quake in the last 50 years (see blue stars)

The last event on the CSZ was Jan. 26, 1700 -- over 317 years ago.



4 Key Earthquake Faults for Clallam







Cascadia Rising 2016 Exercise




HITRAC*

Based on FEMA modeling studies the exercise used the following assumptions:

CSZ <u>**9.0 Richter M**</u> Earthquake & Tsunami

Modelled impacts:

- Direct Impact to 3 States and British Columbia
- Complete rupture of the 800-mile Fault Line
- Impacts affecting over 140,000 square miles
- Ground shaking lasts up to 5 minutes
- Numerous <u>aftershocks</u> with several of M7.0+
- Modelled estimates: 1,000 fatalities from earthquake; 12,000 fatalities from tsunami; 30,000 injured.
 - *DHS 's Homeland Infrastructure
 Threat and Risk Analysis Center



What it Didn't Address

- Landslides
- Avalanches
- Aftershocks
- Aftershock Tsunamis
- Propane Leaks
- Fires
- River Flooding
- Hazardous Materials
- Contamination
- Lack of Food & Water
- Disease
- Exposure

Source – Ed Taylor – Sep 2015 Governor's Safety Conference




CASCADIA SUBDUCTION ZONE (CSZ)

9.0 Richter
Magnitude
Quake will be
100 times more
powerful than
the 6.8 Nisqually
earthquake in
2001.



Magnitudes of Recent Earthquakes

The earthquake off the east coast of Honshu, Japan's largest island, was the fifthlargest ever recorded, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the largest ever recorded in Japan. How it compares in magnitude with other major earthquakes:





Earthquake Aftershocks



CASCADIA SUBDUCTION ZONE (CSZ)

In the first week of a 9.0 Richter Scale Earthquake there will be one 8.0+ and ten 7.0+ Aftershocks

How Many Aftershocks?

- USGS Rule of Thumb
 - For every single decrease in magnitude, get 10 fold increase in number
- If original quake is M 7
 - 1 or so aftershock in range of M 6

- 10	"	"	"	"	5
- 100	"	"	"	"	4
- 1000	"	"	"	"	3

1989 Loma Prieta Aftershocks \$\$ = ≥ **5** _ =≥ 4 □ = ≥ 3 Days after original shock








Chance of Earthquake



- There is a 33% chance of Casadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) Quake of 8.0 in the next 50 years (HiTrac 2013) and 10% chance of 9.0 or greater Quake (total risk 43% in 50 years, starting in 2016).
- There have been 19 Quakes of 9+; 22 Quakes of 8+ over last 10,000 years (average every 200 years)
- The chance of earthquake increases as other faults are considered particularly Lake Creek Boundary.
- Combining the risk of either Lake Creek Boundary Fault or a CSZ event raises Clallam County risk to higher than 50% in the next 50 years.












CASCADIA SUBDUCTION ZONE (CSZ)



Nisqually versus Cascadia



Jeenano	Nisqually	Cascadia
DURATION:	30-40 seconds	4-5 minutes*
0 1 2 3	4 5 6 minute	0 1 2 3 4 5 6
DEATHS:	1	13,000*
INJURIES:	400	30,000*
DAMAGES:	\$2 billion	Over \$80 billion*
BRIDGES DA	MAGED: 66	7,000*
DISPLACED I	PERSONS: 120	915,000*

Sources: Cascadia Rising Scenario; Nisqually Earthquake Clearinghouse Group

MARK NOWLIN / THE SEATTLE TIMES

Latest Research and Lessons Learned from the Cascadia Rising Exercise indicated the assumptions used in the Cascadia Rising Scenario (left) under-estimated: shake time; level of casualties; monetary damage; bridges damaged and number of displaced persons by a 9.0 Richter scale event.


Megaquake closer to Seattle?


Early studies suggested the Cascadia CANADA Subduction Zone would rupture no closer to VICTORIA Seattle than line "A." But new research suggests the rupture ANGELES could extend to line 6 "B," which would SEATTLE mean more shaking and destruction in OCEAN urban areas. OLYMPIA WASHINGTON More information: www.panaa.ora Source: Tim Melbourne, Central Washington University ASTORIA Reporting by SANDI DOUGHTON OREGON Graphic by MARK NOWLIN PORTLAND 6 / THE SEATTLE TIMES



HIGHWAYS AND BRIDGES







There will be no surviving ground routes to the county.

80 % of the roads will suffer pavement failures over 3"

23% of coastal area bridges will be out of service for days.

50 % of Coastal bridges will be damaged and unusable.







HIGHWAY IMPACT Damage Caused by Earthquakes





Christchurch New Zealand November 14, 2016 7.8 Magnitude Quake

24" Displacement Vertical with 4-6 foot separation of the roadway



12" Displacement Vertical with 1-2 foot separation of the roadway



HIGHWAY IMPACT



Landslides Caused by Earthquakes




Hwy 112 - 2009

Some Areas at Risk:

- Morse Creek
- Highway 112
- Highway 113
- Lake Crescent
- Lake Sutherland
- 101 East of Gardiner
- Blyn
- **Black Diamond**
- **Tumwater Truck**
- Hill Street
- South Valley St
- Lee Creek
- **Peabody Creek**
- **Ennis Creek**
- Elwha River Valley
- Hoko-Ozette Road

FEMA UTILITIES



ELECTRICAL GRID

100% will be severely damaged or destroyed.


It may take up to 1 year to restore service to 90 % of the current demand.

WATER AND SANITARY SEWER

100% will be severely damaged or destroyed. 67% of water may be restored as power is repaired. 33% must be rebuilt.

44% of sewer may be restored as power is repaired. 56% must be rebuilt.

COMMUNICATIONS



After the CSZE, the county will experience phone, cell phone, internet, radio and TV outages lasting for months.

It may take days or weeks to restore 33% of coastal communications facilities.

67% may need to be replaced.

unknown


completely destroyed

HITRAC STUDY FEMA



HOSPITALS





These are general locations and forecast status of the known Hospitals.

There are 112 Hospitals in the affected area.

36% suffer severe damage, are unusable, and will likely be completely offline.

<u>17%</u> suffer moderate damage and are only assumed capable of 50% normal capacity.

<u>Total reduction is assumed to be 45% of total</u> hospital capacity.

47% suffer slight damage and are able to continue to operate at capacity.

The facilities nearer to the epicenter suffer most significant damage resulting in <u>virtually no Hospital</u> <u>capacity west of the I5 corridor.</u>

These numbers discuss <u>STRUCTURAL</u> capacity, not patient capacity, which is further reduced due to lack of electricity, potable water, sanitation, etc.


unknown — — — —

completely destroyed



SENIOR LIVING FACILITY





There are approximately 2,156 senior living facilities in the affected area.

Significant numbers (approaching 100%) of facilities West of the I-5 corridor suffer extensive damage, and are likely unusable.

The vast majority of facilities along the I-5 corridor suffer complete to severe damage and are likely unusable, or are significantly degraded.

The facilities nearest the epicenter suffer most significant damage resulting in <u>virtually no</u>
<u>senior living facility capacity West of the</u>
<u>I-5 corridor.</u>


unknown completely destroyed

HITRAC STUDY FEMA



SCHOOLS





There are approximately 2,286 schools in the affected area.

Nearly 100% of schools West of the I-5 corridor suffer complete or severe damage, and are likely unusable.

Schools along the I-5 corridor suffer a wide range of damage from complete to slight.


Schools nearest the epicenter generally suffer the most significant damage resulting in <u>limited</u> shelter capacity West of the I-5 corridor.

unknown completely destroyed


Seismic safety report card

Washington scores poorly compared to other West Coast governments, where retrofits of dangerous school buildings are a priority.

Se	Law or policy on school eismic upgrades	Structural surveys of all at-risk schools	Dedicated funding for school seismic retrofits
British Colum	nbia YES	YES	\$1.7 billion (2004-2016)
Oregon	YES	YES	\$210 million (2009-2016)
California	YES	YES	\$700 million (1972-2016)
Washington	NO	NO	NONE



Communities become micro-islands (Divisions) due to the loss of bridges, roads and tsunami zones.



County's Strategy: Micro-islands (Divisions) are grouped into Command Areas based on the following hubs: Forks, Clallam Bay/Neah Bay, Joyce, Port Angeles, & Sequim



Washington State Emergency Management Division

AREA COMMANDS for CLALLAM COUNTY, WA

COMMAND AREA 1	COMMAND AREA 2	COMMAND AREA 3	COMMAND AREA 4	COMMAND AREA 5
5 islands	5 islands	3 islands	2 islands	5 islands
DIV ALPHA - Neah Bay/Makah Nation	DIV CHARLIE - La Push / Quileutte Nation	DIV KILO - Pillar Point	DIV NOVEMBER - Port Angeles West / Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe; SubDIV 01, SubDIV 02, SubDIV 03, SubDIV 04	DIV PAPA - Deerpark*
DIV BRAVO - Ozette	DIV DELTA - West Jeffco/Hoh Tribe	DIV LIMA - Joyce	DIV OSCAR - Port Angeles East; SubDIV 01, SubDIV 02, SubDIV 03, SubDIV 04,	DIV QUEBEC - R Corner
DIV ECHO - Shipwreck Point	DIV GOLF - Beaver	DIV MIKE - Indian Valley		DIV ROMEO - Carlsborg
DIV FOXTROT - Clallam Bay	DIV HOTEL - Forks			DIV SIERRA - Sequim
DIV INDIA - Pysht	DIV JULIET - Bear Creek			DIV TANGO - Diamond Point, Gardiner, Blyn, Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe
FD#5, NEAH BAY	FD#1, FD #6	FD#4	FD#2, PAFD	FD#3
TRIBAL POLICE, CCSO, CBP, USCG, NPS	FORKS PD, CCSO, CBP, USCG, NPS	CCSO, CBP	PAPD, CCSO, CBP, USCG, NPS	SEQUIM PD, CCSO, CBP
** 1,770	** 4,777	** 3,649	** 23,368	** 36,558

Concept: "Areas of Command" are created after CSZ earthquake occurs divid-ing county into "micro-islands" of response because of highway/bridge damage, landslides & soil lique-faction. Concept based on FEMA HITRAC (Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center) Study completed 2011.



*Mutual Aid Area with FD#2 **population impacted

20 islands total

Note: There is another 4K from Jefferson Co. supported by Fire Districts 1/6 (1K) and 3 (3K) and any tourists in the county




COUNTY EOCS

MICRO-ISLAND NAME (WITH


Washington State Emergency Management Division

CLALLAM COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AREA COMMAND CONCEPT




NOTE: NAMED AREA COMMANDS WITH AN ALPHA DESIGNATION AND ASTERISK (i.e., "Clallam Bay (F^*) " = A STAND ALONE MICRO-ISLAND THAT IS ALSO DESIGNATED AS AN AREA COMMAND CENTER).

AREA COMMAND 4: Port Angeles



Soil liquefaction

Liquefaction is a phenomenon in which water-saturated sandy layers of earth act like liquids due to the pressure created by earthquakes.




Water-saturated granular layer

Lateral movement can


create uneven ground,

damaging structures



Normal pressure

Soft sands can maintain strength or hardness because of friction from the grains touching, even though they are saturated with water.



Force from an earthquake causes the water to increase in pressure. With enough pressure, the water will break the friction in the grains and fill the spaces, causing liquefaction.

Upward movement can penetrate the ground surface



Intense pressure







Movement

Sand layers can slide, causing rips in the ground surface or uneven settling of building foundations. The sand can even push up through the ground.





Preliminary Estimate of Loss of Life in Clallam County



The Need for Volunteer teams (SAR, Shelter, CPOD, Communication) is critical to reduce loss of life

Loss of Life Scenario Ranges			
Cascadian Subduction Zone event will create three waves of losses			
Earthquake itself – structural and debris strikes	800-3000		
Tsunami - Wave impact on coastal areas	1000-5000		
Entrapment & Isolation (1.5x-3x initial deaths)	2700-5500		
• Fragile Population or Special Needs (Oxygen etc.) (Kitsap Public Health Study Medical Dependent15.4K - May 2015 25% High End Loss)	200-4000		
• Food, Water, Exposure (range of 2%-9% of population)	1400-6500		
Includes Disease and Medical Injured that die			
Range of Losses	6100-24000		
•	10K dead scenario region wide		

Losses would be from 6% to near 33% of population of Clallam County depending upon effective mitigation

Above % could and probably would be impacted by high tourist events such as festivals & assumes base population of 72,000



The Golden Day

Entrapped Victim Survival Rate



Creation and deployment of Mission Ready CERT units will be critical in saving lives.* CERTs *primary mission* after an earthquake will be Damage Assessment & SAR.

Time Until Rescue Survival Rate

30 Minutes	99.3%
1 Day	81.0%
2 Days	36.7%
3 Days	33.7%
4 Days	19.0%
5 Days	7.4%

The Rule of 3's

- You can survive:
 - 3 minutes without AIR
 - 3 hours without SHELTER
 from extreme weather
 - 3 days without WATER
 - 3 weeks without FOOD

*Will impact entrapment, isolation, and fragile population numbers







Example of Loss of Life Challenge Search and Rescue Starting on Day 1



Challenge for Clallam County is over 35,000 Households and all commercial and public buildings will need to be searched for survivors

Rescue Skills Needed 1750 Households State or Federal **USAR** USAR Entombed **Teams** 5250 Households Local Fire/Rescue **Void Space Engine Company Emergency** Non-Structural **Services Provider Entrapment** 10,500 Households **CERT Teams** Non-Structural Type IV SAR Teams **Entrapment** 9 Eastern Clallam 1 Joyce **50%** Injured NOT Spontaneous Rescue **Trapped**










Covering the Area from Elwha River to Morse Creek With Potentially 8 Sub-Micro Islands in the two divisions








Detail View of Morse Creek Boundary between Port Angeles East and Deer Park Micro-islands

Possible slide blocks HWY 101

Community marooned. Access/escape blocked by



Tsunami Zone
Landslide Zone

RED dots represent fill failures over culverts or damaged bridges





Detail View of Morse Creek



Cottonwood Lane Landslide and HWY 101 Morse Creek Bridge Bridge Failure & Tsunami with Debris up to this point





Detail View of Morse Creek





HIGHWAY 101 MORSE CREEK LANDSLIDE ZONE





Port Angeles East Micro-island - Division O, Sub-division 2 Monroe Road Community – Lee's Creek to Ennis Creek











Only one other route connects Mt. Pleasant with Port Angeles beside US 101



HIGHWAY 101 LEE'S CREEK CROSSING



HIGHWAY 101 CULVERT OVER ENNIS CREEK

Port Angeles East
Micro-island - Division O,
Sub-division 2
Monroe Road
Community - Lee's
Creek to Ennis Creek





Port Angeles East Micro-island – Division O, Sub-division 3 Golf Course Community – Ennis Creek to White Creek



Expect severe liquefaction and compaction failure in fill over White Creek Valley.

Expect culvert failures over Ennis Creek

Expect culvert failures over White Creek

Liquefaction zone

RED dots represent fill failures over culverts or damaged bridges






Port Angeles East Micro-island - Division O, Sub-division 2 Monroe Road Community – Lee's Creek to Ennis Creek



Earlier Photo shows the amount of fill over White Creek Area




DAYS INN, McDONALD's and the adjacent roads may suffer significant damage due to compacting and liquefaction





Port Angeles East Micro-island - Division O, Sub-division 4
Olympic Medical Center Community – White Creek to Peabody Creek







Peabody Creek from East Park Street to the Harbor failure of culverts and bridges









Destroyed by earthquake and tsunami









Front Street from South Peabody to South Albert Street








The following 5 slides (2 Pages) are source slides showing the condition of Front Street between Peabody and Albert Street. The circles show 3 views of First Congregational Church around 1897. This series of slides is intended to show the ground conditions before the area was developed. Note the logging debris, vegetation and the lack of standardized clearing, grubbing and compaction standards for the neighborhood.





Port Angeles West Micro-island – Division N, Sub-division 1
PAHS Community - Peabody Creek to Valley Creek




All Bridges and Culverts on Peabody Creek and Valley Creek expected to fail





Front Street 1891 - 1892





This slide shows 2 views of Front Street in downtown Port Angeles circa 1891. Please note the location of the shoreline.

Photo #1 looks west from the vicinity of today's Renaissance Bistro.


Photo #2 looks east from the vicinity of Laurel Street. It shows Peabody Creek flooded, frozen and flowing west along Front Street.

This shows a severe liquefaction hazard for all land between the bluff and the harbor.





The Intersection of Front and Lincoln Streets 1887 - 1889



This slide shows a different view of the severe liquefaction conditions near the corner of Front and Lincoln between 1887 and 1889. The common identifying landmark in the 2 photos is the Merchants Hotel.


Peabody Creek flowed out of the uplands down Lincoln Street and turned west on Front Street. It followed Front Street until it entered the harbor near the Coho Ferry Dock.

Photo # 1 looks west from vicinity of Matthews Glass towards the corner where the Transit Center is today. Photo # 2 looks north from the vicinity of the Elk's Naval lodge towards the Transit Center and today's Peabody Creek outlet.






Lincoln Street Landfill







This slide shows the condition of Lincoln Street between 1914 and 1916. The void under this trestle was never cleared and grubbed. It was filled via railroad dump cars. The timbers were not removed and the fill was not compacted. Please note that the canyon proceeds south under today's William Shore Pool, Goodwill, and possible City Hall.




Besides Morse Creek Area the Tumwater/Valley Creek Area poses the next most difficult area to traverse





Port Angeles West Micro-island, Division N, Sub-division 3
Black Diamond Community – Valley Creek to Tumwater Creek south of Hwy 101



RED dots represent fill failures over culverts or damaged bridges





Port Angeles West Micro-island - Division N, Sub-division 4
Airport Community - Tumwater Creek to Elwha River







Port Angeles Severe Liquefaction and Tsunami Zone with Escape Routes



Escape routes are dependent on survivors ability to walk in the liquefaction zone. If survivors can not reach a safe elevation on an escape route in 60 minutes they must climb the bluff until they can look down on the roof of a standing 3 story building.





Resources Available in the Sub-Micro Islands

							Heavy	
Micro-island	Sub-division	Medical	Fire	Police	Food	Water	Equip	
O - PA East	Mount Pleasant	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	
	Monroe	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	
	Golf Course	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
	Olympic Medical CTR	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	
N - PA West	PAHS	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	
	Cedar Street	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	
	Black Diamond	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	
	Airport	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	

Definitions: Medical = Clinic or Hospital

Police = Police Station/CBP/Fed/NP

Water = Body of Water to Draw

Fire = Fire Station PA and District 2


Food = Major Grocery

Heavy Equip = Business or Contractor Yard






The Key for Port Angeles's citizens survival is the airport which can land large cargo planes as road re-supply is virtually impossible for at least 90-180 days*




William F. Fairchild Airport as Emergency Operations Base makes good sense based on the number of assets around the airport and soil quality in the area.



The 1964 Quake is the only event we have to compare the damage expected in 9.0 Cascadia







Coast ~120-130 miles from Fault Line A

Seiche Tsunami



No Direct Tsunami; the tsunami was caused by the sloshing of water due to shaking in Cook Inlet







Tsunami Action Pushed Material Inland & Fire Breaks Out













- Shops Dropped 8 Feet
- Hillside Behind Hospital Collapsed
- Downtown homes & business knocked off foundations












Commercial Damage


Left: 4 Seasons Apartments

Right: McKinley Tower

Bottom: Roads Collasped








Turnagain Neighborhood Suffers a Landslide











Same neighborhood today


Road through the center of Turnagain Neighborhood

Note the Fire Hydrant at the side of the road 3" or

greater road displacement







Bridge & Rail System Suffer Displacement



















IS HELP COMING?

How soon will help come?

When will it get here?

Who will it be?





The State & County Plan



The Air Bridge: Our Lifeline to feed 8 Million Northwesterners



Given the loss of roads/bridges, an air-bridge is the fastest way to bring help. It is our job to have the airfields ready to receive aircraft and distribute the materials

The Tiered Air Base Concept Supplies will flow through a Tiered Airbase Distribution System

Tier 1 Airbase – 747/C-5A capable with ground support and logistics facilities (SEATAC)


Tier 2 Airbase – C17/C130 capable with ground support and logistics facilities (Fairchild and Quillayute NAS)

Tier 3 Airbase – Small plane and helicopter capable (Sekiu, Sequim, Forks, Port Townsend and Diamond Point)

Tier 4 – Helicopter capable (a helicopter landing zone)







Government Playbook for Disaster Response





Final Thoughts



- This briefing you received is based on the work of the best minds in this country addressing this problem (private, local, state, and federal)
 - We work continuously to incorporate the best and latest knowledge into the response plan.
- We are not here to be alarmists, but as realists
 - We have begun this difficult conversation with the community in Eastern Clallam, Joyce, Sequim and Forks
 - Over 3,500 citizens have attended presentations of Cascadia and preparedness in theses areas by the three of us in the last 18 months
 - Their overwhelming response to us was "tell us the whole truth no matter how bad and we will figure out how to solve it"
 - Our communities are finding solutions which we can share with you at a later briefing
 - We have waited until this time to insure we present a solid and realistic picture
 - The material presented is based on well vetted science not available even 5 years ago
 - This information dramatically changes our threat profile from a "2" on a scale of 10, to a "10+"
 - Cascadia is the 2nd greatest concern for the Federal Government, exceeding anything associated with California Earthquakes or Gulf Hurricanes
 - Cascadia requires a "Call to Action" as this will happen "It's Just a Matter of Time"
- Everyone will be looking to us to solve their issues
- Everyone (All public employees) will need to assume leadership roles
- Citizens will also *need to respond* to "Call to Actions" and *volunteer*
- We all need to think outside of the box to minimize casualties and loss of property


























Earthquake Faults in Washington State



The Air Bridge: Our Lifeline to feed 8 Million Northwesterners



Given the loss of roads/bridges, an air-bridge is the fastest way to bring help. It is *our job* to have the airfields ready to receive aircraft

The Tiered Air Base Concept Supplies will flow through a Tier Airbase Distribution System

Tier 1 Airbase – 747/C-5A capable with ground support and logistics facilities (SEATAC)

Tier 2 Airbase – C17/C130 capable with ground support and logistics facilities (Fairchild and Quillayute NAS)

Tier 3 Airbase – Small plane and helicopter capable (Sekiu, Sequim, Forks, Port Townsend and Diamond Point)

Tier 4 – Helicopter capable (a helicopter landing zone)





Tiered Base Concept



National Level "Point of Origin"

Tier 1

Based on existing airports

- Largest capability (747/C5)
- Identified now
- Preplan usage now
- Pre-coordinate design now
- Acts as all Tiers
- Provides distribution to local communities







ISB – Incident Support Base – First level of logistical distribution. Provides distribution to FSAs. All handled commodities belong to FEMA until assigned to an FSA. One ISB is tentatively allocated to Wash State in CSZ.

FSA - Forward Staging Area - Second level of distribution, provides distribution to State Flow of Logistics and Inbound Resources Staging Areas. Doctrine is changing to create three sub-types of FSA (Type, 1, 2, 3, based on capacity). Two FEMA FSAs are tentatively allocated to Wash State in the CSZ.

RBC - Responder Base Camp - Third level of FEMA basing. This is where out-of-state responders are based upon arrival. These are the State's

CPOD - Community Point of Distribution - This is the

final step in the logistical distribution. It is the

responsibility of the local EM / IC to coordinate.

Based on existing airports

- 2nd largest capability (C17/C130)
- Identified now
- Preplan usage
- Pre-coordinate design
- Serves as log base and RBC
- Provides distribution to local communities





- Preplan usage
- Pre-coordinate design
- Serves as log base and RBC
- Provides distribution to local communities



Tier 4

Rotary Wing / Vertical Lift

- Same capabilities, less capacity
- Location selected ICW local FM
- Template now, confirm later






- Tier 5 Final Point of Distribution
- Identified by Local EM
- Established daily



Basing Concept



Establish Tier 3 and 4 Bases



These are the key airfields we need to make ready to receive help and supplies



Tier 3 bases (Orange dots •) at Sekiu, City of Forks, Sequim and Diamond Point


Tier 4 heliports (Black dots ●) at Neah Bay, LaPush, Beaver, Hungry Bear, Shadow Mtn Store and Voice of America


Distribution from these bases to Tier 5 Community Points of Distribution (CPODs) will be by ground or boat transport determined daily by the EOC.


Washington, Idaho, Montana, other State's National Guard and Federal Forces





Resources are NOT based on *Seattle First*, they are pre-allocated to regions

















DOD Personnel Requirement

Region 1: 5,637 Region 6: 6,260

Region 2: 2,881 East: 2,896

Region 3: 6,891 TF Aviation: 2,689


Region 4: 3,610 TF CBRNE: 4,152 Region 5: 5,059 **Total: 40,075** Region 5
DOD Forces

CA
DASF

CA
DASF

Special Operations Brigade Pacific - Rangers, Airborne and Special Forces







Special Operations Brigade Pacific - Rangers, Airborne and Special Forces





The icons below are not necessarily Service Component specific. In some cases these resources are only available in one Service Component. A typical configuration was used to perform calculations. In most cases Army organizational structure was used as the default.


















Maritime Response

U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF)

Washington's Plan for Maritime Support

- 1. Will land at Two locations
 - The force landing at Grays Harbor will support the local community. Route Clearance operations will focus on opening land lines of communication in the area.
 - 2. The force landing at Port Angeles will support the population. Route Clearance operations will focus on opening land lines of communication in the area.
- 2. Each location will require
 - 1. Medical
 - 2. Motor Transport
 - 3. Bulk Fuel
 - 4. Route Clearance
 - 5. Water Purification





We will be working with Third Fleet to assess beachheads & pushing to move their landing site to Sequim Bay out of the debris zone and closer to where the population is (75K between Eastern Clallam & Jefferson) until Port Angeles harbor can be cleared and road out can be established to Eastern Clallam and Jefferson.



Special Operations Brigade Pacific – Fuel Response





UNCLASSIFIED

DLA Fuel Farm at Manchester

~25 Million gallons of Diesel

~50 Million Gallons of Jet Fuel

This fuel is used early in PH2A/B to sustain the response as infrastructure is emplaced that will enable long term sustainment. Distribution is via fuel barge on waterways, and heavy lift helicopter and fuel bladders to response critical need.

40K gallon fuel farm (minimum) established via above ground fuel bladders (2x 20K bladders minimum), fueled from fixed wing download.

Tier 2 **20K Gallon fuel farm** (minimum) established via above ground fuel bladders (1x 20K bladders minimum), fueled from fixed wing download.


Tier 3 20K Gallon fuel farm (minimum) established via above ground fuel bladders (1x 20K bladders minimum), fueled from fixed wing download.

need, established via above ground fuel bladders, fueled by rotary wing or over-the-ground when available.

NOTE: There is virtually no DOD capacity for storage, transfer, or distribution of bulk MOGAS or LPG.







Mission

Establish Level I, II, and III aid stations throughout the State in order to provide emergent life saving services for any injured persons and to evacuate to higher echelons of care.

Treatment

Triage, treat, return to duty, or coordinate evacuation of injured survivors through necessary echelons of care.

Evacuation

Air evacuation is preferred but ground evacuation will be utilized where feasible. Level I facilities will evacuate patients to level II or III facilities. Level II will evacuate patients to level III facilities, and Level III will evacuate patients out of theater.

Aid Station Locations Level I: Co-located with Tier 4 Bases Level I augmented with Civilian Doctors & Nurses Level II: Co-located with Tier 2 & 3 Bases Level III: Co-located with Tier 1 Bases

Acronyms

ASMC: Area Support Medical Company

CSH: Combat Support Hospital

FST: Field Surgical Team

Tiered Base Concept



- <u>Tier 1</u> (BSI/ISB/SSA)
 - JRSOI/RIP (Air Control/Communications)
 - Equipment staging & bed down
 - Resource transfer (H2O, CL I-IX)
 - Refuel (Ground & Rotary Wing)
 - Medical triage / treatment / transfer (Level III)
 - Limited human & pet sheltering
 - Responder sustainment
 - Distribution LOD for local area
 - 747/C5 capable
 - Possible Railhead / Trucking depot
- Tier 2 (BSI/FSA/SSA)
 - JRSOI/RIP
 - Equipment staging & bed down
 - Resource transfer (H2O, CL I-IX)
 - Refuel (Ground & Rotary Wing)
 - Medical triage / treatment / transfer (Level II)
 - Limited human & pet sheltering
 - Distribution LOD for local area
 - Responder sustainment
 - C17 / C130 capable
 - Possible railhead / truck depot

- <u>Tier 3</u> (FSA/SSA)
 - JRSOI/RIP (Limited)
 - Equipment staging & bed down
 - Resource transfer (H2O, CL I-IX)
 - Refuel (Ground & Rotary Wing)
 - Medical triage / treatment / transfer (Level II)
 - Limited human & pet sheltering
 - Distribution LOD for local area
 - Responder sustainment
 - Less than C130 capable (C23)
 - NOT rail or truck capable (Isolated)
- Tier 4 (SSA/RBC)
 - Equipment staging & bed down
 - Resource transfer (H2O, CL I-IX)
 - Refuel (Ground & Rotary Wing)
 - Medical triage / treatment / transfer (Level I)
 - Limited human & pet sheltering
 - Responder sustainment
 - Distribution LOD for local area
 - Rotary Wing / vertical lift capable
- <u>Tier 5</u> (CPOD)
 - Community Points of Distribution
 - Medical CCPs (Basic First Aid)
 - Hasty Collection Points (SAR)